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Stanley Klein and Shaun Nichols describe the case of patient R.B., whose memories (they claim) lacked 
the sense of “mineness” usually conveyed by memory. Klein and Nichols take R.B.’s case to show that the 
sense of mineness is merely a contingent feature of memory, which they see as raising two problems for 
memory-based accounts of personal identity. First, they see it as potentially undermining the appeal of 
memory-based accounts. Second, they take it to show that the conception of quasi-memory that underpins 
many memory-based accounts is inadequate. I argue that Klein and Nichols’ characterisation of R.B.’s 
experience is implausible; as a result, the problems that they describe for memory-based accounts of 
personal identity do not arise. 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
When we remember, we experience a strong sense of identity with the subject of the remembered 
experiences. Memory has been viewed by many philosophers since John Locke as key to explaining 
personal identity through time (for brevity, personal identity, or simply identity when the context 
permits). Locke (1731) viewed memory as constitutive of personal identity; Thomas Reid (1785) and 
Joseph Butler (1736) took memory to be evidence of it; and David Hume (1739/2000), whilst 
denying that persons persist, acknowledged that memory provides a powerful illusion of such 
persistence. Memory-based accounts of personal identity remain popular to this day; indeed, they 
embody what is perhaps the dominant contemporary view.1 
According to such accounts, a person P at time t is identical to a person P1 at a later time t1 if 
P1 at t1 remembers P’s experiences at t.2 Since identity is transitive, it can also arise from overlapping 
strands of such memory links: if P2 at t2 does not remember P’s experiences at t, P2 at t2 and P at t are 
nevertheless identical if P2 at t2 remembers P1’s experiences at t1, and if P1 at t1 remembers P’s 
                                                          
1 E.g. Shoemaker, 1970; Shoemaker and Swinburne, 1984; Perry, 1975a; Lewis, 1976; Parfit, 1984; Noonan, 1989. 
2 P1 must remember P’s experiences “from the inside,” in Shoemaker’s (1984) terminology. 
Memory and Mineness in Personal Identity 
3 
 
experiences at t.3 Since, by definition, we remember only our own experiences, memory-based 
accounts often replace the notion of memory with that of quasi-memory in order to avoid circularity. 
Derek Parfit, elaborating on Sydney Shoemaker’s (1970) idea, defined quasi-memory as follows: I 
have a quasi-memory of an experience if I seem to remember having the experience, someone had the 
experience, and “my apparent memory is causally dependent, in the right kind of way, on that past 
experience” (Parfit, 1984, p. 220). Those who appeal to the notion of quasi-memory in accounting 
for identity claim that ordinary memory is a sub-category of quasi-memory. From my quasi-memory 
of doing X, I cannot infer that I did X, but I can infer that somebody did X. Whether I am identical 
with the doer of X depends on what personal identity consists in. Defenders of memory-based 
accounts escape the charge of circularity by arguing that, when they say that identity consists in 
memory, what they mean is that it consists in quasi-memory subject to certain constraints. These 
constraints are specified without presupposing personal identity between quasi-rememberer and 
subject of quasi-remembered experiences. 
Having noted the centrality of memory to discussions of personal identity, Stanley Klein and 
Shaun Nichols introduce patient R.B., whose memories, after he was hit by a car, were left devoid of 
the sense of “mineness” that usually accompanies our memories. Klein and Nichols take R.B.’s case 
to demonstrate that this sense of mineness is “a contingent feature of memory” (Klein and Nichols, 
2012, p. 689). They see this as having two important implications for the relationship between 
memory and the metaphysics of personal identity. First, they see it as potentially undermining 
memory-based accounts of personal identity by undermining the appeal of such accounts. Second, 
they draw on it to raise a problem for Parfit’s canonical characterisation of quasi-memory. Since the 
plausibility of memory-based accounts of personal identity depends upon the coherence of the 
concept of quasi-memory, this constitutes a further blow for such accounts. The implications of 
Klein and Nichols’ conclusions about R.B. for memory-based accounts will be my focus in this 
paper. 
Whilst I am primarily concerned with Klein and Nichols’ claims about the relevance of 
R.B.’s case to personal identity, it is worth also noting that their particular conception of R.B.’s 
experiences has been used by Klein in many later publications to support claims about the structure 
of memory and its role in our conceptions of ourselves. He has used it, for example, to argue for a 
particular view of how scientists should approach the study of the self (Klein, 2012a), for a particular 
                                                          
3 This rough characterisation misrepresents aspects of some memory-based accounts. E.g. Lewis (1976) takes the 
psychological links that constitute identity to hold between person stages, not between persons. 
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role that memory plays in future-oriented mental time travel (Klein, 2012b), that episodic and 
semantic memory are more similar than is generally supposed (Klein, 2013a), that the function of 
memory is not to enable us to “relive” the past (Klein, 2013b), and that autonoetic awareness is not 
intrinsically linked to episodic memory (Klein, 2014b, 2015). 
I will argue that Klein and Nichols’ conception of R.B.’s case is untenable. Specifically, R.B.’s 
memories are not most plausibly described as ordinary memories minus the usual sense of mineness, 
and the claim that mineness is a contingent feature of memory is indefensible. As a result, Klein and 
Nichols’ account does not raise problems for memory-based accounts of personal identity. I will 
proceed as follows. In the next section, I review Klein and Nichols’ interpretation of R.B.’s 
experiences. Since Klein and Nichols do not specify precisely how their conclusions about R.B. might 
undermine memory-based accounts, I speculate about this in section 3. In section 4, I argue that 
Klein and Nichols’ characterisation of R.B.’s memories is implausible and that, as a result, it poses 
no threat to memory-based accounts. I also dismiss the problem they raise about quasi-memory. In 
section 5, I consider and reject a way of salvaging Klein and Nichols’ claim that mineness is a 
contingent feature of memory. I conclude that R.B.’s case contains little to disturb philosophers of 
personal identity. Moreover, it cannot play the role that Klein requires of it in his later psychological 
work. 
 
 
2.  R.B.’s “unowned” memories 
 
Klein and Nichols explain that long-term memory comprises two memory systems: procedural 
(corresponding to Gilbert Ryle’s (1945-46) “knowing how”) and declarative (“knowing that”). 
Declarative memory is subdivided into semantic and episodic memory. Semantic memory “contains 
relatively generic, context-free information about the world, such as Grapes are edible, 2 + 2 = 4, and 
Sacramento is the capital of California” (Klein and Nichols, 2012, p. 679). Recalling semantic memories 
involves recalling information without necessarily recalling the experience of acquiring it. Episodic 
memory, on the other hand, involves “re-experiencing” (p. 680) one’s past: it  
 
represents the “what, where, when” of an event. As such, it is experienced as a memory that makes 
explicit reference to the time and place of its acquisition. Examples of episodic memory are I remember 
eating chicken for supper yesterday evening; I recall my meeting with Judith last Monday. (p. 679) 
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Klein and Nichols note that philosophical discussions of the role of memory in personal 
identity generally focus on episodic memory (p. 680). Semantic memory is involved in some aspects 
of self-knowledge (pp. 680-81), but only episodic memory conveys a sense of the self persisting. 
Against this background, Klein and Nichols introduce the case of R.B. After being hit by a 
car, forty-three-year-old R.B. suffered physical injuries along with cognitive and memory 
impairments. Most startling for Klein and Nichols is that 
 
R.B. was able to remember particular incidents from his life accompanied by temporal, spatial, and self-
referential knowledge, but he did not feel the memories he experienced belonged to him. In his words, 
they lacked “ownership”. This particular form of memory impairment—episodic recollection absent a 
sense of personal ownership, is a form of memory dissociation that, to our knowledge, has not previously 
been documented in the neurological literature. (p. 684) 
 
Klein and Nichols use the terms sense of (personal) ownership, sense of (numerical) (personal) identity 
and sense of mineness interchangeably. In what follows, I favour sense of mineness, often abbreviated to 
mineness. 
Let us examine Klein and Nichols’ reasons for claiming that R.B. experienced episodic 
memories minus mineness. They begin by arguing that R.B.’s unusual memories were episodic rather 
than semantic. They base this conclusion on the “temporal, spatial, and self-referential” (p. 685) 
nature of these memories and on R.B.’s claim to have been “remembering scenes, not facts” (p. 
687). These features are characteristic of episodic, but not of semantic, memory. 
What of the claim that R.B.’s memories lacked mineness? Klein and Nichols view 
themselves as taking R.B.’s talk of ownership at face value: “R.B. himself initiated use of the 
language of ‘ownership’[.] We simply adopt his expression” (p. 685). Consequently, they offer no 
analysis of this “language of ‘ownership’.” They write as if, aside from lacking mineness, R.B.’s 
memories were intact; that is, as if the lack of mineness was the only way in which R.B.’s memories 
were unusual. They do not state this explicitly, but they make many remarks that collectively are 
strongly indicative of this interpretation. For example, they tell us that R.B.’s memory, “though 
fitting the standard criteria for episodic recollection, was not accompanied by a sense of personal 
ownership” (p. 685; a similar comment appears at p. 687). They also write of episodic memories 
being composed of two separable components, content and mineness: “In R.B., the ‘mineness’ of 
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episodic recollection is separated from the content” (p. 694; a similar remark appears at p. 689), and 
in the abstract to the paper they claim that the sense of self conveyed by memory “derives from two 
components, one delivering the content of the memory and the other generating the sense of 
mineness” (p. 677). Similarly, they refer to “mental machinery”—defective in R.B.’s case—whose 
role it is to “insert a distinctive I-tag into memories” (p. 690; a similar comment appears at p. 689). 
And, on a number of other occasions, they describe R.B.’s impairment in terms of episodic memory 
minus mineness without mentioning any other ways in which R.B.’s memories were unusual (see, for 
example, p. 684, three times at p. 689, p. 690). Let us call the view according to which R.B.’s 
memories were unusual solely in their lack of mineness the minus mineness view. 
 
 
3.  Implications of the minus mineness view for the metaphysics of personal identity 
 
Klein and Nichols argue that, historically, the sense of mineness has been an important motivation 
for taking memory to be central to personal identity: “Lockeans use this sense to build a theory of 
personal identity; Reid and Butler appeal to this sense as evidence for a persisting self; and Humeans 
maintain that the sense presents us with an illusion of a persisting self” (p. 678). They quote Reid 
and Butler expressing the view that mineness provides evidence of identity. Reid wrote: 
 
How do you know—what evidence have you—that there is such a permanent self which has a claim to all 
the thoughts, actions, and feelings which you call yours? 
To this I answer, that the proper evidence I have of all this is remembrance ... my memory testifies, 
not only that this was done, but that it was done by me who now remember it. If it was done by me, I 
must have existed at that time, and continued to exist from that time to the present. (Reid, 1785, p. 318; 
cited at Klein and Nichols, 2012, p. 695) 
 
Butler wrote: 
 
[W]hen any one reflects upon a past action of his own, he is just as certain of the person who did that 
action, namely himself, the person who now reflects on it, as he is certain that the action was at all done. 
(Butler, 1736, p. 295; cited at Klein and Nichols, 2012, pp. 695–96) 
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Klein and Nichols stop short of specifying whether, given their observations about R.B., 
mineness really is evidence of identity, viewing this as a task for another occasion. However, their 
comments are suggestive of a negative answer. They claim that “the case of R.B. indicates that this 
sense of identity is dissociable from episodic memory itself. The sense of identity turns out to be, 
pace Reid, a contingent feature of memory” (p. 689), and that “the sense of personal identity is really 
a by-product of the episodic memory system. That is just how episodic memory happens to work” 
(p. 696). Consequently, work needs to be done to “evaluat[e] the extent to which the sense of 
identity can be taken to reflect the reality of identity” (p. 696). 
Klein and Nichols, then, take R.B.’s case to pose a problem for memory-based accounts by 
raising the possibility that mineness has led defenders of those accounts to over-estimate the 
plausibility of the view that memory provides evidence of personal identity. However, they move 
very quickly—in their concluding paragraph—from the claim that mineness is a contingent by-
product of memory to the claim that it may not reflect “the reality of identity.” They do not explain 
exactly how their conception of R.B.’s unusual experiences raises problems for memory-based 
accounts. Since those accounts do not depend upon the claim that memory is accompanied by a 
sense of mineness, it is not obvious that Klein and Nichols raise any such problems. It will, then, be 
helpful to reflect on why they might believe that they do. 
To this end, let us consider Klein and Nichols’ argument in the context of their wider 
research. Klein is a psychologist, one of whose key research interests is self-representation. Nichols 
is an experimental philosopher. Experimental philosophy draws on empirical data, particularly those 
pertaining to ordinary people’s intuitions, to elucidate philosophical issues. Writing with fellow 
experimental philosopher Joshua Knobe, Nichols tells us that 
 
[T]he first major goal of experimental philosophy … is to determine what leads us to have the intuitions 
we do about free will, moral responsibility, the afterlife. The ultimate hope is that we can use this 
information to help determine whether the psychological sources of the beliefs undercut the warrant for 
the beliefs. (Knobe and Nichols, 2008a, p. 7) 
 
If Klein and Nichols’ argument is sound, then the “psychological source” of the belief that 
memory provides evidence of identity is the sense of mineness, which is merely a contingent by-
product of memory. If mineness is only contingently linked to memory, then it is nomologically 
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possible—that is, possible were our brains to work differently4—for mineness never to accompany 
memory.5 Mineness, according to Klein and Nichols, is what historically has motivated memory-
based accounts of personal identity. So, unless there are reasons for linking memory with identity 
that do not relate to mineness, Klein and Nichols’ argument may “undercut the warrant for the 
belief” that memory provides evidence of identity by raising the possibility that mineness leads us to 
overestimate the extent to which memory is evidence for identity. This does not directly undermine 
the claim—central to memory-based accounts of personal identity—that identity consists in memory 
links, but it does challenge defenders of those accounts to show that they have not been misled in 
thinking memory so integral to identity. Klein and Nichols’ conclusion that mineness is contingently 
linked with memory, then, presses us to re-evaluate the centrality of memory to identity. It may turn 
out, following such a re-evaluation, that memory deserves its central role in accounting for identity. 
On the other hand, it may turn out to be a red herring. 
Would it really matter much if Klein and Nichols show memory to be a red herring in 
accounting for identity? After all, whilst Locke is famously said to have viewed identity to consist 
solely in memory,6 and whilst this view remains highly influential, there are well-known problems 
with it. These problems include the consequence that persons cease to exist during moments not 
later remembered. Some contemporary memory-based accounts escape this problem by viewing 
memory as evidence of identity without being constitutive of it;7 others take identity to be 
constituted by memory alongside other forms of psychological continuity, such as the persistence of 
personality traits, beliefs, values, and so on.8 The latter approach, which involves replacing a 
memory-based account with a broader psychological account, can recognise identity even in the absence 
of memory. Indeed, Shoemaker argued that memory is important in accounting for identity because 
it is evidence of the sort of causal dependence of later psychological states on earlier ones that, on 
his view, is required for personal persistence; yet, provided that other forms of psychological 
                                                          
4 Klein and Nichols indicate that they are concerned with nomological possibility at p. 683. They refer to it again in their 
conclusion, where they claim that mineness is a by-product of memory in that “[t]hat is just how episodic memory 
happens to work” (p. 696). 
5 In section 5, I outline two ways to interpret the claim that mineness is a contingent feature of memory, and argue that 
the stronger interpretation is appropriate. I have applied the stronger interpretation here. 
6 E.g. Flew, 1951, p. 55; Mackie, 1976, pp. 178–79; Parfit, 1984, p. 205; and Noonan, 1989, p. 9. Locke never explicitly 
endorsed this view, and some (e.g. Gustafsson, 2010) have argued that he held a weaker view. 
7 E.g. Slors, 2001. 
8 E.g. Shoemaker, 1970; Shoemaker and Swinburne, 1984; Perry, 1975a; Lewis, 1976; Parfit, 1984; Noonan 1989. 
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continuity can be taken to involve similar relations of causal dependence, continuity of non-memory 
psychological states “has as good a claim to be constitutive of a fact of personal identity” as does 
continuity of memory (Shoemaker, 1979, p. 326; see also Shoemaker, 1984, pp. 87–88). Even if 
Klein and Nichols undermine the appeal of memory-based accounts, then, psychological accounts 
may remain tenable. 
Despite this post-Lockean dilution of memory, however, it retains a starring role in 
psychological accounts. Shoemaker claimed that “[r]emembering is best seen as just a special, albeit 
very important, case of the retention of acquired mental states” (Shoemaker, 1979, p. 326; see also 
Shoemaker, 1984, p. 90). More recently, Marc Slors wrote: 
 
To be sure, memory is not thought to exhaust psychological continuity, but neither is it considered to be 
an optional ingredient. In fact, contemporary conceptions of psychological continuity evolved by adding 
various kinds of psychological connections between person-stages—connections such as those established 
by perpetuated beliefs, values, and character traits or by relations between intentions and actions—to John 
Locke’s memory criterion of identity; this criterion is held to be too tight, but correct in spirit. (Slors, 
2001, pp. 186–87)  
 
Since, as Slors observed, psychological accounts historically evolved out of memory-based 
accounts, the appeal of the former plausibly derives from the appeal of the latter. As a result, if we 
must re-evaluate the appeal of memory-based accounts, then we must re-evaluate the appeal of 
psychological accounts. This means that the problem that Klein and Nichols raise for memory-based 
accounts or personal identity cannot be evaded by subscribing instead to a wider psychological 
account. 
Further, mineness may explain why memory enjoys a special role in psychological accounts. 
Shoemaker notes that “the concept of memory is itself a causal concept … a present belief or 
impression counts as a memory of a past action or experience only if it stands to it in an appropriate 
causal relationship” (Shoemaker, 1979, p. 324; see also Shoemaker, 1984, pp. 95–96). By contrast, 
whilst “cross-temporal similarity” of certain other psychological states generally involves causal 
dependence of later states on earlier ones, the mere fact of cross-temporal similarity does not imply 
causal dependence in the way that the existence of memory-links does. As such, cross-temporal 
similarity of non-memory psychological states is evidence of personal identity only on the additional 
assumption that earlier states cause later ones. 
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Why does the very concept of memory involve causality? Why do we not, instead, view 
memories merely as resemblances of experiences—a conception that would make memory 
comparable to other sorts of psychological continuity on Shoemaker’s account? Here, too, mineness 
provides an answer. Recall that Klein and Nichols emphasise the role played by mineness in 
memory-based accounts by quoting Reid’s comment that “my memory testifies, not only that this 
was done, but that it was done by me who now remember it,” and Butler’s remark that, when a 
person remembers an action, “he is just as certain of the person who did that action, namely himself, 
the person who now reflects on it, as he is certain that the action was at all done.” What emerges 
from these remarks is not merely that one’s memories resemble one’s past experiences, but that one 
remembers those experiences because one had them, and that in remembering one is aware of this 
causal dependence. Arguably, then, mineness explains why memory is a causal concept and why 
defenders of psychological accounts view memory as a special type of psychological continuity.  
Whilst psychological accounts rely less heavily on memory than memory-based accounts, 
then, there are reasons to believe that both are motivated by mineness. Therefore, if successful, 
Klein and Nichols’ argument may undermine the appeal not just of memory-based accounts, but 
also of psychological accounts. (Hereafter, for simplicity, I shall write only of memory-based 
accounts. My comments about them extend to psychological accounts.) There are, however, strong 
reasons to reject Klein and Nichols’ conclusions. In particular, there are strong reasons to reject the 
minus mineness view. Let us turn to them now. 
 
 
4.  Challenging the minus mineness view 
 
The most pressing reason to reject the minus mineness view is that it is not supported by R.B’s 
remarks.9 Consider his report of recollecting a scene from his time spent as a student at MIT: 
 
I can picture the scene perfectly clearly … studying with my friends in our study lounge. I can “relive” it in 
the sense of re-running the experience of being there. But it has the feeling of imagining, [as if] re-running 
                                                          
9 As far as I can ascertain, comments by R.B. other than those reported in Klein and Nichols, 2012, are unavailable 
elsewhere. Klein discusses R.B. in various other places—including Klein, 2012a; Klein, 2012b; Klein, 2013a; Klein, 
2013b; Klein, 2014a; Klein, 2014b; Klein, 2015—but these contain no additional relevant information about R.B., and 
the reader is referred to Klein and Nichols, 2012, for a full discussion of R.B. 
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an experience that my parents described from their college days. It did not feel like it was something that 
really had been a part of my life. Intellectually I suppose I never doubted that it was a part of my life. 
Perhaps because there was such continuity of memories that fit a pattern that lead up to the present time. 
But that in itself did not help change the feeling of ownership. (Klein and Nichols, 2012, p. 686) 
 
R.B.’s experience “has the feeling of imagining,” but “intellectually”—perhaps based on its 
coherence with other memories—he is able to identify it as a memory of an event from his past. 
This report does not (as Klein and Nichols assume) convey that the experience felt just like a 
memory except that it lacked mineness, but that it did not feel like a memory at all. R.B. makes 
similar, albeit less explicit, comments about other memories. For example, he reports that whilst his 
memory of his pre-injury past was “just fine,” “none of it was ‘me’. It was the same sort of 
knowledge I might have about how my parents met or the history of the Civil War” (p. 685). These 
memories of his life before the injury, he says, involved “remembering scenes, not facts” (p. 686)—a 
detail that Klein and Nichols take to indicate that the memories described by R.B. were episodic 
rather than semantic. All this suggests that R.B.’s episodic memories felt to him like imaginative 
reconstructions based on semantic memories of other people’s accounts; that, after all, is how one 
would likely come to represent scenes from one’s parents’ first meeting or the Civil War.  
The comment that Klein and Nichols seem to view as most supportive of their view—since 
they focus exclusively on it when discussing the implications of R.B.’s case (pp. 689-90, p. 693)—is: 
 
I could clearly recall a scene of me at the beach in New London with my family as a child. But the feeling 
was that the scene was not my memory. As if I was looking at a photo of someone else’s vacation. (p. 686) 
 
Even this is ambiguous, however. Klein and Nichols interpret the latter half of the second 
sentence as “the scene was not my memory”—that is, as emphasising the memory’s lack of 
mineness—yet it also bears the interpretation, “the scene was not my memory.” The latter 
interpretation, which implies that the experience felt unlike a memory, echoes R.B.’s other 
comments in this vein. R.B.’s accounts of his unusual memories, then, do not support the claim that 
these memories were unusual solely in their lack of mineness; that is, R.B.’s account does not 
support the minus mineness view. 
Whilst R.B.’s reports provide reason to resist the minus mineness view, we should be 
suspicious of his comparison of his memories to imaginings. He implies that, since his memories felt 
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like imaginings, they felt unlike ordinary memories; yet memories and imaginings often feel similar. 
That we can confuse them is both a commonplace of everyday life and a phenomenon that has been 
experimentally reproduced and observed many times.10 The neurologist Oliver Sacks describes the 
experience of discovering such a confusion. On relating to his brother his recollection of a bomb 
falling near their house during the Second World War, Sacks learns that he could not have an 
episodic memory of the event: 
 
[Michael] said, “You never saw it. You weren’t there.” 
I was staggered by Michael’s words. How could he dispute a memory I would not hesitate to swear 
on in a court of law, and had never doubted as real? “What do you mean?” I objected. “I can see the 
bomb in my mind’s eye now, Pa with his pump, and Marcus and David with their buckets of water. How 
could I see it so clearly if I wasn’t there?” 
“You never saw it,” Michael repeated. “We were both away at Braefield at the time. But David [our 
older brother] wrote us a letter about it. A very vivid, dramatic letter. You were enthralled by it.” Clearly, I 
had not only been enthralled, but must have constructed the scene in my mind, from David’s words, and 
then appropriated it, and taken it for a memory of my own. (Sacks, 2013) 
 
Sacks illustrates that memories and imaginings can be phenomenologically indistinguishable. 
Therefore, the unusual nature of R.B.’s memories cannot be adequately explained by comparing 
them to imaginings. How, then, should we explain it? 
One possibility is that, in claiming that they felt like imaginings, R.B. meant that his 
memories felt like new imaginings. In experiments to test the extent to which misinformation is 
incorporated into apparent episodic memories, a longer delay between providing subjects with 
misinformation and testing their memory is associated with an increased likelihood of the subject 
claiming to have episodic memories incorporating the misinformation (Higham, 1998). Memories of 
imaginative reconstructions of described events, then, are increasingly likely to be mistaken for 
episodic memories of those events as time passes. One reason for this is that, soon after 
encountering a description, one is more likely to remember having done so (Loftus, 2005, p. 362). 
Another reason relates to the fact that memories of imaginings are associated with more information 
about cognitive operations and less perceptual and contextual information than memories of 
external (non-imagined) events (Johnson et al., 1993, p. 4). Over time, we forget information about 
                                                          
10 See Loftus 2005 and the references therein. 
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cognitive operations associated with memories of imaginings, and we also forget perceptual and 
contextual information associated with memories of external events, making it easier to confuse 
memories of long-past external events with memories of long-past imaginings (Brédart et al., 2003, 
p. 9).  
We should pause to note that there are at least two ways of interpreting R.B.’s terminology 
of the feeling of memories and imaginings. On the one hand, R.B. might be referring to the 
phenomenology of these states. On the other, he might be referring loosely to whatever features of 
memories and imaginings usually enable him automatically and subconsciously to identify them; 
these features could involve phenomenology, content, metacognitive tagging and/or something else. 
His claim that “[my memory] has the feeling of imagining,” on the former interpretation, means “my 
memory has the phenomenology of imagining;” on the latter interpretation, it means “my memory 
has those features (whatever they are) that I usually subconsciously associate with imagining.” 
Adopting the former interpretation involves ascribing to R.B. conceptual tools not generally 
possessed by non-philosophers. Since we have no reason to believe he is a philosopher, the latter 
interpretation is more natural. As such, his claims about how his memories felt are compatible with 
the observations of the previous paragraph; that is, with the view that memories and imaginings are 
at least sometimes distinguished on the basis of the sort of content-based features mentioned by 
Loftus, Johnson et al., and Brédart et al. His claims are also compatible, on this interpretation, with 
the view that neither memories nor imaginings involve any proprietary phenomenology—a view to 
which I wish to remain open. In adopting R.B.’s terminology of the feeling of memory and imagining, 
then, I do not refer specifically to the phenomenology of these states, but in a shorthand way to 
whatever means we generally use automatically and subconsciously to identify them. (Specifying 
these means is beyond the scope of this paper.)  
Since memories of long-past external events may feel like memories of long-past imaginings, 
that Sacks mistook his memory of an imaginative reconstruction for an episodic memory of an 
external event may be attributable to the fact that many years had passed since he read his brother’s 
description of the event. On the other hand, R.B.’s memories may—for reasons that are unclear—
have felt like memories of recent imaginative reconstructions (or, simply, like imaginative 
reconstructions), which we would expect to feel different to old episodic memories. If they indeed 
had this character, his experience is comparable to crytomnesia, in which information is forgotten 
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then remembered without being recognised by the subject, who mistakes it for new information.11 
Cryptomnesia can involve episodic memory, as demonstrated by George Harrison’s unwitting 
plagiarism of Ronald Mack’s song, “He’s So Fine,” in his own “My Sweet Lord.” Harrison was 
prosecuted for infringement of copyright, but the judge commented that he did not believe that 
Harrison had consciously plagiarised Mack.12 Rather, Harrison had heard, forgotten, then 
remembered the song as if it were an original idea of his own. If, as in cryptomnesia, R.B.’s 
memories felt like recent imaginings, whilst what they depicted revealed them to be episodic 
memories, it is understandable that he claimed not to feel ownership of them.13 
These reflections highlight the point that it may be inappropriate to view R.B.’s memories—
as Klein and Nichols do—as lacking some characteristic of normal experience, i.e. mineness. His 
account provides no more support for the view that some phenomenological aspect of normal 
memory was absent from his experiences than for the view that his memories possessed some 
additional, abnormal phenomenological feature. That R.B. himself reports a lack of ownership does 
not justify adopting the former view. Schizophrenics often report a lack of ownership of their 
actions, yet the most influential view of schizophrenic experience takes it to have a 
phenomenological character that is absent in healthy individuals.14 A striking illustration of this is 
provided by the fact that some schizophrenics, unlike healthy people, are able to tickle themselves 
(Blakemore et al., 2000). 
Not only is the minus mineness view unsupported by R.B.’s reports, it also leads Klein and 
Nichols to some unattractive conclusions. They claim that whilst R.B. was capable of third-person 
knowledge about the subject of his remembered experiences—that is, he “had no trouble 
representing that R.B. had experiences on a beach in New London” (p. 689)—he lacked the ability, 
characteristic of episodic memory, of “representing, from the first person, ‘I had these experiences’” 
(p. 690). This claim is contradicted by R.B.’s reports. He is quoted many times expressing first-
person knowledge about his remembered past, such as when he says, “I am able to re-live [the 
event]. I have a feeling, a sense of being there” (p. 687). Moreover, Klein and Nichols claim that 
                                                          
11 Brown and Murphy, 1989; Brédart et al., 2003; Sacks 2013. 
12 This conclusion is endorsed by Sacks (2013). 
13 Comparing R.B.’s experience to cryptomnesia is intended only to illustrate that old episodic memories can be mistaken 
for new imaginings. We have no reason to believe that R.B. experienced cryptomnesia since we have no reason to 
believe that his unusual memories were forgotten then rediscovered. 
14 Frith, 1992; Brüne, 2005. 
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R.B.’s problem with first-person representation is “natural[ly]” explained by his lacking “a special 
kind of conceptual self-representation” (p. 690)—the “‘I’-concept”—which they characterise with 
reference to John Perry’s (1977) account of indexicals. However, their view that first-person 
indexical thought involves conceptual self-representation is controversial. The difficulties in 
accounting for indexical self-reference have led some to conclude that “I” does not refer at all;15 and 
D.H. Mellor (1988-89) has argued that whilst “I” refers, its reference does not involve conceptual 
self-representation. Klein and Nichols’ conclusions about first-person representation, then, are both 
irrelevant and controversial. 
Klein and Nichols invoke their view that memory is accompanied by a separable “I”-concept 
to raise a problem about quasi-memory. Recall that, according to Parfit, quasi-memories must be 
caused “in the right kind of way.” Klein and Nichols argue that “quasi-memory theorists” (p. 695)—
that is, defenders of memory-based accounts who replace claims about memory with claims about 
quasi-memory—must state whether the “I”-concept, some other form of self-representation, or 
none of these “is required in order for a candidate quasi-memory to count as being ‘caused in the 
normal way’” (pp. 694-95). Failure to do so leaves quasi-memory theorists vulnerable to the charge 
that some aspect of memory not captured by Parfit’s account of quasi-memory is involved in 
personal identity, which could make quasi-memory a poor replacement for memory.16 
This attack on quasi-memory may be ignored by anyone who rejects Klein and Nichols’ 
claim that mineness is separable from memory. It is, however, puzzling that Klein and Nichols 
should take R.B.’s case to raise a problem for Parfit’s conception of quasi-memory. Parfit claimed 
that our memories “come with a belief that … they are about our own experiences,” and that this 
“separable” belief would be absent were we to quasi-remember other people’s experiences (Parfit, 
1984, p. 222). His view that memories are accompanied by a separable belief that they depict one’s 
own experiences closely resembles Klein and Nichols’ view that memories are accompanied by a 
separable “I”-concept. As such, it is difficult to see why Klein and Nichols’ account of R.B.’s 
experiences should raise a problem for Parfit. On the contrary, their account—were it tenable—
might be viewed as providing empirical support for Parfit’s claim about separability.17 
                                                          
15 Anscombe, 1975; Diamond and Teichman, 1979. 
16 Klein and Nichols do not spell out this implication for quasi-memory theorists. I infer it from their view that this issue 
is important because “[t]he notion of quasi-memory is supposed to undergird a theory of personal identity” (p. 694). 
17 Even so, Parfit’s claim that quasi-memory can be conceived as memory minus the belief that the depicted experiences 
are one’s own, given his view that quasi-memory can replace memory in accounting for identity, is controversial. John 
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Since R.B.’s case does not support the minus mineness view, defenders of memory-based 
accounts of personal identity may ignore the problems raised by Klein and Nichols. R.B.’s case 
supports only the weaker claim that his memories did not feel like memories. For convenience, let us 
say that they lacked a feeling of memory, which is a shorthand way of saying that R.B.’s memories were 
not identifiable as such using whatever automatic, subconscious means he usually employs to 
identify memories. Let us consider whether this weaker claim can support Klein and Nichols’ claim 
that mineness is a contingent feature of memory, which is required in order to sustain their attack on 
memory-based accounts of personal identity. 
 
 
5.  R.B. minus minus mineness 
 
Can Klein and Nichols’ claim that mineness is a contingent feature of memory be salvaged without 
invoking the minus mineness view? A defender of Klein and Nichols may argue that, far from ruling 
out this claim, the view that R.B.’s memories lacked a feeling of memory entails it. Since R.B.’s 
memories did not feel like memories, and since an experience that does not feel like a memory ipso 
facto does not feel like a memory of one’s own experience, R.B.’s memories lacked mineness in virtue 
of lacking a feeling of memory. Suppose that Klein and Nichols’ defender holds a weaker version of 
their views about mineness, such that by “R.B.’s memories lacked mineness,” she means only “R.B.’s 
memories were such that he did not feel that they depicted his own past experiences.” She does not, 
then, hold the (stronger) minus mineness view. To reiterate, the minus mineness view involves the 
claim that R.B.’s memories were unusual solely in their lack of mineness; by contrast, “R.B.’s 
memories were such that he did not feel that they depicted his own past experiences” does not entail 
any particular claim about what is wrong with the memories. Is the claim that mineness is a 
contingent feature of memory plausible on this toned-down version of Klein and Nichols’ account? 
 It is not. The toned-down account recognises that R.B.’s case does not support the view that 
memories could lack mineness without also lacking a feeling of memory. As such, it makes the 
plausibility of the claim that mineness is a contingent feature of memory dependent on the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
McDowell, Quassim Cassam, and David Wiggins have argued that this conception of quasi-memory is parasitic on the 
idea of memory, therefore it cannot replace memory in the way intended by Parfit. I have argued elsewhere that, whilst 
this objection applies to quasi-memory as Parfit introduces it, his main conclusion—that what matters in survival is not 
identity—demands only on a weaker, more plausible conception of quasi-memory (Roache 2006). 
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plausibility of the claim that the feeling of memory is a contingent feature of memory. For Klein and 
Nichols’ attack on memory-based accounts of personal identity to work, then, it must be plausible 
that the feeling of memory is a contingent feature of memory. But this latter claim is not plausible. 
Let me explain.  
There are two possible ways to interpret the claim that the feeling of memory is a contingent 
feature of memory. On one interpretation, for any episodic memory, that memory could lack a 
feeling of memory. On a stronger interpretation, it is possible for episodic memory never to be linked 
with a feeling of memory. Let’s consider each of these in turn.  
The weaker interpretation need entail only that one may have a single episodic memory that 
feels unlike a memory whilst the rest feel like memories. This need not concern defenders of 
memory-based accounts, who do not require memory to be perfect, and who can accept the odd 
confused memory provided that many other memories are preserved. Since Klein and Nichols 
believe the claim that mineness is a contingent feature of memory to raise a problem for memory-
based accounts, it would be inappropriate to ascribe to them the weaker interpretation. 
On the other hand, the stronger interpretation is implausible. Episodic memory is not merely 
a capacity to represent one’s past experiences; it is a faculty for non-inferential knowledge about 
one’s past.18 In normal circumstances, remembering X is sufficient for (fallibly) knowing that X 
occurred. These normal circumstances involve, inter alia, recognising our memories as such: to derive 
knowledge that X occurred from one’s memory of X, one must be able to distinguish remembering 
X from other attitudes towards X, including imagining. Were our memories routinely to lack a feeling 
of memory, we would be unable to make such distinctions without drawing inferences from external 
information, such as the reports of others. In this case, episodic memory would not be a faculty for 
non-inferential knowledge about the past. Consequently, the feeling of memory is not a contingent 
feature of episodic memory; neither, therefore, is mineness.  
I have argued that it is conceptually impossible for memory routinely to lack a feeling of 
memory. Since what is conceptually impossible cannot be nomologically possible, my conclusion 
undermines Klein and Nichols’ claim that it is nomologically possible for memory routinely to lack 
mineness. More generally, my conclusion also cautions us against drawing generalisations about the 
dispensability of features of memory (and, indeed, other mental states) from cases like R.B. That a 
subject who spends the first forty-three years of his life with a fully functional episodic memory 
                                                          
18 Goldman, 1967; Cassam, 1997; Wright, 2003. 
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system should then, for a relatively short period, experience episodic memories that are abnormal in 
some respect does not entail that it is in any way possible for episodic memory always to take this 
abnormal form. At best, it may show that the episodic memory system could work differently; but 
this does not entail that its outputs in that event could be properly deemed memories rather than, 
for example, mere representations or resemblances of past events. 
 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
Klein and Nichols take R.B.’s case to raise problems for memory-based accounts of personal 
identity. We have seen, however, that the problems they raise presuppose their view of R.B.’s 
experiences. Since there are persuasive reasons to reject their view, R.B.’s case need not worry 
philosophers of personal identity. The implausibility of their view of R.B. also means that R.B.’s case 
cannot bear the argumentative weight that Klein places on it in his later psychological work. Whilst 
re-evaluating his conclusions—about, for example, how scientists should study the self, and the 
similarities between episodic and semantic memory—is a task that lies beyond the scope of this 
paper, these conclusions must stand independently of Klein and Nichols’ conception of R.B.’s 
experiences if they are to be tenable.19 
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